International donor support for rural development (including electrification) in the global South is often implemented in close partnership with national governments. However, increasingly national governments are the cause of dire conflict situations, involving human rights abuses, mass casualties, and socio-economic fallout from constant violence and lack of safety of civilians.
| The most severely impacted sub-regions within conflict-ridden countries are typically indigenous and ethnic regions that are underdeveloped and off-grid. It is in these regions that rural development programs, including community-based micro hydro projects, are located. This year we have been tracking situations in Myanmar, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and others in order to understand the impact of conflict on rural development efforts and vice versa. Below HPNET Manager and Facilitator, Dipti Vaghela, shares her reflections. |  Anglophone rights activist Mancho Bibixy speaking in a 2017 rally in Bamenda, Cameroon. Credit: Phonix22, Wikimedia Commons |
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
International development partners can better integrate political economy analyses into the design of their programs. For example, in the case of Myanmar prior to the 2021 coup the country had faced government takeover by the national military thrice since its national independence from the British in 1948. While the closely monitored 2015 elections were democratic, the NLD government’s victory was a pseudo-democracy since the advantages granted by the country’s constitution to the Myanmar military dictatorship had not changed with the election.
International development partners can better integrate political economy analyses into the design of their programs. For example, in the case of Myanmar prior to the 2021 coup the country had faced government takeover by the national military thrice since its national independence from the British in 1948. While the closely monitored 2015 elections were democratic, the NLD government’s victory was a pseudo-democracy since the advantages granted by the country’s constitution to the Myanmar military dictatorship had not changed with the election.
In spite of the obvious history of national military rule and its restraint on the civilian government, many international multilateral financiers and bi-lateral donors that entered the country after 2013 chose the fledgling national government as their primary client. The repercussions of this decision are the missed opportunities to strategically use development initiatives as a tool to empower civilians and weaken the junta. Had the country’s political economy been accounted for by international development partners, a looming coup would have been anticipated, and the primary recipients of international support would have been local and non-government actors. However, doing so would have required international partners to revamp their approaches to build trust with local practitioners.
Mass demonstration in Yangon soon after Feb. 2021 coup. Credit: Twitter
The situation is similar in Cameroon and Ethiopia, where the conflicts are also rooted within national governments. When governments begin to commit human rights violations, their international development partners can only simply cut ties with the government, having no institutional leverage to negotiate on behalf of ethnic and marginalized civilians. However, hindsight analyses can help donors integrate the realities of local and national political economy into future scoping missions and program designs.
RESILIENCE OF LOCAL AND NON-GOVERNMENT STAKEHOLDERS
As the need for rural development has become greater with the pandemic and the humanitarian situations, international donors now seek non-government partners to deploy aid and support in countries of conflict. However, such a noble approach comes too late -- local non-government actors are forced to focus on maintaining basic safety (ironically from violence caused by the same national governments that were supported by international donors) and economic stability.
As the need for rural development has become greater with the pandemic and the humanitarian situations, international donors now seek non-government partners to deploy aid and support in countries of conflict. However, such a noble approach comes too late -- local non-government actors are forced to focus on maintaining basic safety (ironically from violence caused by the same national governments that were supported by international donors) and economic stability.
Yet local civil society organizations (CSOs) and local private enterprises continue to be resilient in the face of the conflict. In Myanmar local CSOs have pooled together to provide aid to ethnic regions destroyed by the national military, micro hydro communities continue to build climate and economic resilience in a devastated economy, and local private sector actors have forged ahead with their promises to electrify communities. In Cameroon and Ethiopia government censorship has prevented access to understanding the plight of impacted rural communities, but it is clear that activists living in the conflict regions are frontline changemakers.
While it will be difficult for international aid to support the frontline during conflict, it is still valuable to conduct a hindsight analysis on what alternatives to government partnerships could have been more strategic from a political economy perspective. From the energy access and local practitioner aspects of rural development, we offer the following hindsight.
A micro hydro community in Cameroon. Credit: WISIONS
MITIGATING INTERNAL BIASES
The staff and consultants of international development organizations come with their own biases, based on their professional journeys. The biases prevent them from fully understanding the political economy aspects of energy access. For example, they may be more open to a practitioner that is an English-versed extrovert with less experience and not from the local region, than an English-challenged introvert who has an extensive track record and is based locally. They may chastise the crude appearance of locally developed technology without understanding the constraints it was built under nor the value of the local social capital that resulted. The presence of such biases during the scoping of a mission and during every engagement between international and local, non-government stakeholders impedes trust-building. The biases can be countered by acknowledging them and taking support from bridge-building facilitators who can strategize around the strengths, weaknesses, and incentives of the differing international donor, government, and non-government contexts.
The staff and consultants of international development organizations come with their own biases, based on their professional journeys. The biases prevent them from fully understanding the political economy aspects of energy access. For example, they may be more open to a practitioner that is an English-versed extrovert with less experience and not from the local region, than an English-challenged introvert who has an extensive track record and is based locally. They may chastise the crude appearance of locally developed technology without understanding the constraints it was built under nor the value of the local social capital that resulted. The presence of such biases during the scoping of a mission and during every engagement between international and local, non-government stakeholders impedes trust-building. The biases can be countered by acknowledging them and taking support from bridge-building facilitators who can strategize around the strengths, weaknesses, and incentives of the differing international donor, government, and non-government contexts.
 Forebay tank of a community-financed micro hydro project in Shan State Myanmar, functioning since 2005. Credit: D. Vaghela |  A micro hydro, Francis turbine electrifying 150+ households in Shan State, Myanmar, since 2005. Credit: D. Vaghela |
TWO-WAY, RESULTS BASED CAPACITY BUILDING
Local capacity building is a vital aspect of any development initiative to sustain itself post-implementation. However, often the approach used by international development partners are not results-based, outcome-oriented, nor linked to implementation. At times the specific need for knowledge building is not addressed because the international development partner has not taken initiative, effort, and/or lacks skill to understand the local context, and relies only on what its consultants can offer. Trainers fly in for some days without having ample time to build understanding prior to the training event and follow up after. Participant selection does not prioritize local practitioners; and when it does the targeted actors do not want to attend due to lack of trust and assurance of the training meeting their needs.
Local capacity building is a vital aspect of any development initiative to sustain itself post-implementation. However, often the approach used by international development partners are not results-based, outcome-oriented, nor linked to implementation. At times the specific need for knowledge building is not addressed because the international development partner has not taken initiative, effort, and/or lacks skill to understand the local context, and relies only on what its consultants can offer. Trainers fly in for some days without having ample time to build understanding prior to the training event and follow up after. Participant selection does not prioritize local practitioners; and when it does the targeted actors do not want to attend due to lack of trust and assurance of the training meeting their needs.
Such pitfalls can be addressed with two-way learning between international and local stakeholders, where capacity building includes international actors learning from local practitioners. In this way local knowledge is valued as much as international knowhow, i.e. local trainers are paid as much as international trainers. Valuing local expertise is a robust and efficient way to build trust with local stakeholders, which also helps to develop customized, impact-based interventions. Scaled micro hydro contexts embraced two-way learning. For example, Swiss trainers in Nepal in the early 1990s designed technical capacity building after understanding existing manufacturing skills and facilities, EnDev Indonesia’s management spent weeks in the field to understand the existing situation before iterating their program, and HPNET’s work in Myanmar started with a scoping mission led by local organizations involving foreign partners, and created space for two-way learning with international development organizations.
Local practitioner for the first time sharing about his 25 years of micro hydro experience to international and government stakeholders, at HPNET's 2014 event in Myanmar, supported by WISIONS. Credit: P. Pawletko
OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND?
As international development partners exit conflict stricken countries, the media’s attention fades, and funding priorities shift, the dire situations on the ground continue to worsen. The progress of taxpayer-funded, international development interventions is unraveled. Some donors stay on but must abide by the oppressive regimes’ rules, including not spotlighting the humanitarian crises and not holding the regime responsible. While addressing post-conflict downstream impact (e.g. refugee crises) is critical, more must be done to integrate political economy analyses and the strengthening of local, non-government entities in development and aid interventions.
As international development partners exit conflict stricken countries, the media’s attention fades, and funding priorities shift, the dire situations on the ground continue to worsen. The progress of taxpayer-funded, international development interventions is unraveled. Some donors stay on but must abide by the oppressive regimes’ rules, including not spotlighting the humanitarian crises and not holding the regime responsible. While addressing post-conflict downstream impact (e.g. refugee crises) is critical, more must be done to integrate political economy analyses and the strengthening of local, non-government entities in development and aid interventions.
